COMPLAINT TO TIM HORTON'S ABOUT MIXED RACE COUPLE TV AD

Written by Paul Fromm

Tuesday, 05 July 2011 05:01

COMPLAINT TO TIM HORTON'S ABOUT MIXED RACE COUPLE TV AD Canada First Immigration Reform Committee, P.O. Box 332, Rexdale, ON., M9W 5L3 PH: 905-274-3868 Tim Hortons Investor Relations 874 Sinclair Road Oakville, Ontario L6K 2Y1 Phone: 905.339.6186 Email: [email protected] June 30, 2011 Dear Sirs: I have been a shareholder in Tim Horton’s for more than 10 years and enjoy the company’s products on a regular basis. I am writing out of concern with the current television ad for Tim Horton’s that is being widely shown. The ad features two couples driving off for a motor vacation. One will follow the other. They’re a bit concerned they may get separated or lost. So, they agree to rendezvous at the next Tim Horton’s. The concept is cute and appealing and emphasizes that Tim Horton’s outlets are almost everywhere. Now, here’s my problem. The couples are supposed to be “everyman” Canadians. The first couple is a brunette man with a brunette woman. The second couple is a blonde woman with a Negro male. While there are interracial couples in Canada, statistically such relationships are infrequent. Many ethnic and religious groups strongly disapprove of relationships outside the group. The inclusion of the mixed race couple is gratuitous and, to many people, offensive. It also has absolutely nothing to do with the name recognition or good feeling the ad should be trying to create for the Tim Horton’s brand. A CBC News report (January 15, 2007) noted: “According to Statistics Canada, interracial couples made up 3%, or 452,000, of Canada's married or common-law couples in 2001 -- that's up 35% since 1991. But while the majority of respondents had no problem dealing with a taxi driver, doctor, supervisor or neighbour of another ethnicity, their response was markedly different when asked how they would feel if their child were to intermarry. Sixteen percent say it would depend on the race, and 9 % said they would react negatively.” The inclusion of the mixed race couple is preachy and verges on relationship advocacy, which is certainly not Tim Horton’s role. Hoping that you will withdraw or re-cast this ad, I remain, Your loyal customer and interested shareholder, Paul Fromm _____________________________ Unsubscribe / Change Profile: http://ymlp134.net/u.php?id=gmjhqsqgsgbbqgbb Powered by YourMailingListProvider

 

Environmentalists Gone Mad: Australian Gov't Wants to Exterminate Farting Camels to R

Written by Paul Fromm

Tuesday, 05 July 2011 02:31

*Environmentalists Gone Mad: Australian Gov't Wants to Exterminate Farting Camels to Reduce their "Carbon Footprint"* Radical environmentalists in the Australian Government would seem to have gone mad. Perhaps, too long in the Outback sun. They've floated a proposal to exterminate many of Australia's wild camels that roam the Northern Territory. '"The world's association of camel scientists fought back angrily on Monday over Australian plans to kill wild dromedaries on the grounds that their flatulence adds to global warming. The idea is 'false and stupid... a scientific aberration', the International Society of Camelid Research and Development (ISOCARD) charged, saying camels were being made culprits for a man-made problem. "We believe that the good-hearted people and innovating nation of Australia can come up with better and smarter solutions than eradicating camels in inhumane ways,' it said. The kill-a-camel suggestion is floated in a paper distributed by Australia's Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, as part of consultations for reducing the country's carbon footprint. The scheme is the brainchild of an Adelaide-based commercial company, Northwest Carbon, a land and animal management consultancy, which proposes whacking feral camels in exchange for carbon credits. Camels were introduced to the Outback in the 19th century to help early settlers cope with hot, arid conditions. Now they number around 1.2 million and, say some, are a pest because of the damage they inflict to vegetation and their intestinal gases. Each camel, according to the champions of a cull, emits 45 kilos (99 pounds) of methane, the equivalent of one tonne a year in carbon dioxide (CO2), the main warming gas. Northwest Carbon says it would shoot the camels from helicopters or corral them before sending them to an abattoir for eating by humans or pets. But ISOCARD, an association of more than 300 researchers headquartered at al Ain University in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), said the calculations were absurd. ... 'The metabolic efficiency of camel is higher than that of cattle, (...) camels are able to produce 20-percent more milk by eating 20-percent less food, they have different digestive system and are more efficient in the utilization of poor quality roughages,' it noted. In addition, the bacterial flora of camel intestines means their digestion is closer to that of monogastric animals, such as pigs, rather than as cattle and sheep, said ISOCARD." (Agence France Press, July 4, 2011) An Australian nationalist of our acquaintance comments: "So knock off the farting camels, instead of addressing the impulsive, polluting, improvident, greedy and arrogant Third World countries that we are about to subsidize for in paying worthless Carbon Tax." Right on! " *Wind of change: Aussie 'farting camels' cull under attack* (AFP) – 14 hours ago PARIS — The world's association of camel scientists fought back angrily on Monday over Australian plans to kill wild dromedaries on the grounds that their flatulence adds to global warming. The idea is "false and stupid... a scientific aberration", the International Society of Camelid Research and Development (ISOCARD) charged, saying camels were being made culprits for a man-made problem. "We believe that the good-hearted people and innovating nation of Australia can come up with better and smarter solutions than eradicating camels in inhumane ways," it said. The kill-a-camel suggestion is floated in a paper distributed by Australia's Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, as part of consultations for reducing the country's carbon footprint. The scheme is the brainchild of an Adelaide-based commercial company, Northwest Carbon, a land and animal management consultancy, which proposes whacking feral camels in exchange for carbon credits. Camels were introduced to the Outback in the 19th century to help early settlers cope with hot, arid conditions. Now they number around 1.2 million and, say some, are a pest because of the damage they inflict to vegetation and their intestinal gases. Each camel, according to the champions of a cull, emits 45 kilos (99 pounds) of methane, the equivalent of one tonne a year in carbon dioxide (CO2), the main warming gas. Northwest Carbon says it would shoot the camels from helicopters or corral them before sending them to an abattoir for eating by humans or pets. But ISOCARD, an association of more than 300 researchers headquartered at al Ain University in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), said the calculations were absurd. "The estimation of methane emission by camels is based on cattle data extrapolation," it said in a press release. "The metabolic efficiency of camel is higher than that of cattle, (...) camels are able to produce 20-percent more milk by eating 20-percent less food, they have different digestive system and are more efficient in the utilization of poor quality roughages," it noted. In addition, the bacterial flora of camel intestines means their digestion is closer to that of monogastric animals, such as pigs, rather than as cattle and sheep, said ISOCARD. "Therefore, the estimation of camel methane emission is quite debatable, as well as the estimated feral population." The 28 million camels in the world represent less than one percent of all vegetation-eating biomass, and their emissions are just a tiny fraction of those made by cattle, it argued. "The feral dromedary camels should be seen as an incomparable resource in arid environments," the group said. "They can and should be exploited for food (meat and milk), skin and hides, tourism etcetera." Australia is heavily reliant on coal-fired power and mining exports and has one of the highest per-capita carbon levels in the world. The government plans to tax the nation's 1,000 biggest polluters for carbon emissions from mid-2012, with a fixed price giving way to a cap-and-trade scheme within five years. To offset their emissions, polluters could buy carbon credits -- CO2 or other greenhouse gases that are avoided through other schemes.

 

CAFE Factum in Marc Lemire Sec. 13 ("Internet Censorship") Judicial Review

Written by Paul Fromm

Tuesday, 05 July 2011 01:57

- * ------------------------------ ------------------------------ CAFE Factum in Marc Lemire Sec. 13 ("Internet Censorship") Judicial Review . ------------------------------ * ------------------------------ ------------------------------ ** ** *File No. : T-1640-09* *FEDERAL COURT* *** * *** * *BETWEEN:* *CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION* *Applicant* *** * *AND:* *RICHARD WARMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL * *OF CANADA and MARC LEMIRE* *Respondents* *** * *AND:* *BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION,* *CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION,* *CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION INC.,* *CANADIAN FREE SPEECH LEAGUE,* *AFRICAN CANADIAN LEGAL CLINIC,* *LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF B’NAI BRITH CANADA,* *CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS and* *FRIENDS OF SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTRE FOR HOLOCAUST STUDIES* *** * *Interveners* *** * * ------------------------------ * *MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND LAW* *CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION INC.* * ------------------------------ * *** * *** * *PART I – OVERVIEW* *** * **1. **This is an application brought by the Applicant Canadian Human Rights Commission pursuant to Section 18.1(3) of the Federal Court Act.**** ** ** **2. **The Application is by way of judicial review of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision of Athanosios D. Hadjis rendered on September 2, 2009.**** ** ** **3. **Member Hadjis refused to apply sections 13, 54(1) and 54(1.1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act on the grounds that the impugned sections are inconsistent with Section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and could not be saved by Section 1 of the Charter.**** ** ** **4. **The Canadian Association for Free Expression (“CAFE”) has been granted intervener status to put forward its submissions at the hearing of this Application for judicial review.**** ** ** *PART II – FACTS* * * **5. **On September 2nd, 2009, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (“CHRT”) determined the within complaint in favour of the Respondent Marc Lemire in a precedent setting decision.**** ** ** 6. The Statement of Facts set out in the Factum of counsel by the Respondent, Marc Lemire, contains an in-depth analysis and recitation of the events both leading up to the complaint by the Respondent Warman, and with the facts as found by Member Hadjis after a lengthy series of hearings spanning three years.**** ** ** 7. The intervener, CAFE, accepts as correct the historical record as presented to the Tribunal by counsel for the Respondent Lemire, Ms. Barbara Kulaszka.**** ** ** 8. Similarly, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (“CCLA”) accurately sets the stage for argument over the legal issues involved in this review at paras. 2-3, 8 to 16, of their Concise Statement of Fact.**** ** ** *PART III – ISSUES, ARGUMENT AND LAW* * * 9. The issues are viewed as follows:**** *(a) Did the Tribunal err in law in finding that Section 13 of the Act in conjunction with Sections 54(1) and 54(1.1) are inconsistent with Section 2(b) of the Charter?* * * * (b) Did the Tribunal err in failing to sever Sections 54(1) and 54(1.1) from the effects of Section 13?* * * * (c) Are Sections 13, 54(1) and 54(1.1) constitutionally valid?* * * 10. The provisions of Canada’s Section 13 have been hotly debated worldwide following the recent challenges to its provisions in the hearings involving author and commentator Mark Steyn and MacLean’s magazine under the equivalent Section 7(1)(b) of the British Columbia Human Rights Code.** ** *Mohamed Elmasry et al. v. Roger’s Publishing Ltd. and Ken MacQueen* * *(2008) BCHRT 378**** ** ** 11. Where the history of the CHRT and various provincial tribunals have enjoyed significant success in prosecuting complaints against individuals filed by Richard Warman under Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act or its provincial equivalent, the Elmasry claim was rejected outright in the highly publicized decision due largely to intense publicity: **** *“The controversy was also fuelled by both parties’ use of the media to express their views about the case. Some of the blog entries directly related to these activities. Maclean’s, for example, published an editorial critical of the complainants and the human rights process and, as we learned from Mr. Awan’s evidence, he was involved in at least one press conference with respect to the filing of these and other complaints and appeared on CBC television with others, including the author of the Article, to debate the issues raised in it.”* * **Elmasry et al. v. Roger’s *(supra) @ para. 153**** ** ** 12. The Elmasry Tribunal ruled further:**** *“Whether we agree with the Article’s content is not the issue. The Article sets out purported facts, draws conclusions from these facts, and expresses opinions, which many would, and did, find objectionable and disagreeable.”* * **Elmasry et al. v. Roger’s *(supra) @ para. 153**** 13. To that point the statistics had remained unchanged as set out in Ms. Kulaszka’s Memorandum of Fact and Law at para. 25 and which is worth repeating:**** *“In the 30 year history of the provision, not one respondent before a Tribunal has even had a complaint dismissed on the merits prior to Lemire. The rate of settlement prior to being sent to a Tribunal or while before a Tribunal is the exact opposite of those for all other complaints made under the CHRA. The CHRC has appeared at and carried every s. 13 case since its inception on the grounds that cases under section 13 are of such significant public interest, analogous to a Crown prosecution. The only respondents ever jailed form contempt of Tribunal orders are respondents in s. 13 complaints.”* ** ** 14. The publicity also included fierce attacks upon the various provincial Human Rights Commission across Canada by author and columnist, Ezra Levant both by his published books and articles, and his own appearance before the Alberta Human Rights Commission in 2008.**** Ezra Levant; “Shakedown”, McLelland & Stewart, 2009**** ** ** *ISSUE #1 - Did the Tribunal err in law in finding that Section 13 of the Act in conjunction with Sections 54(1) and 54(1.1) are inconsistent with Section 2(b) of the Charter?* * * 15. In 1990, the ruling in the *Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Taylor* Justice Dickson set the bar for finding quilt under Section 13 by ruling that Section 13, while offensive to Section 2(b) of the Charter, was nonetheless saved by Section 1 thereof.**** 92. “*Having concluded that neither s. 13(1) nor the cease and desist order of the Tribunal unjustifiably infringes s. 2(b) of the Charter, I would answer the constitutional questions as follows:* * 1. * *Is s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, as amended, consistent with the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?* *Answer: No* * * * * * 2. * *If s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, as amended, is inconsistent with the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is it a reasonable limit on that freedom within the meaning of s. 1 of the Charter?* * Answer: Yes* * * * * * 3. * *Are the order of the Human Rights Tribunal of July 20, 1979, and the orders of the Federal Court, Trial Division of January 24 and August 15, 1984, subject to challenge under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and, if so, are they consistent with the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression as guaranteed by s. 2(b)?* * Answer: Assuming that the Charter applies, these orders infringe s. 2(b) of the Charter.* * * * 4. * *If the order of the Human Rights Tribunal of July 20, 1979, and the orders of the Federal Court, Trial Division of January 24 and August 15, 1984, are subject to challenge under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and are inconsistent with the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression as guaranteed by s. 2(b), do they constitute a reasonable limit on that freedom within the meaning of s. 1 of the Charter?”* * * *Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Taylor * **** (1990) S.C.R. 892 @ p. 943, per Dickson, C.J.**** ** ** 16. It is important to note that the court in *Taylor* was sharply divided. It is also important to note that the vigorous dissent of Madam Justice McLachlin may carry the day with the currently constituted Supreme Court. In her words:**** *“The significance of the infringement of the right at issue in this case is most serious. The limitation touches expression which may be relevant to social and political issues. Free expression on such matters has long been regarded as fundamental to the working of a free democracy and to the maintenance and preservation of our most fundamental freedoms. The right to express oneself freely on such matters is not lightly to be trammelled; a limitation on such expression must be proportionate to the evil and sensitive to the need to preserve as much freedom of expression as may be compatible with suppressing that evil.”* * Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Taylor *(supra) **** @ para. 163 per MacLachlin, J.A.**** ** ** 17. It is not unusual for a court to consider and favour a past dissenting judgment as a basis for new law. In a free expression debate over whether a town council could enact a blanket by-law forbidding the posting of social events on public utility poles, the court stated: **** *“However, I find more helpful the dissent of Brennan J. (Marshall and Blackmun JJ. concurring) which discussed, at p. 830, less restrictive alternatives than a complete ban on postering.”* *Ramsden v. Peterborough (City)* * *(1993) S.C.R. 1084, per Iacobucci, J. @ para. 43**** ** ** 18. It is clear that the court in *Taylor* did not have the benefit of reviewing the amended provisions of Section 54 of the Act which would certainly have distinguished *Taylor *from the facts in *Lemire. *As member Hadjis properly decided after reviewing the proportionality test:*** * *“As I have found above, this context has changed with the introduction of the penalty in s. 54(1)(c). Section 13(1) now plays a significant and more than "minimal" role in the imposition of both financial and moral sanctions.”* * Reasons for Decision, Member A. D. Hadjis* * @ para. 293* * * 19. The 1998 changes in the Canadian Human Rights Act constitute a significant and substantive change in the juristic manner in which the provisions of Section 13 should be decided. The changes included:**** (i) A penalty provision was added to the remedies in Section 54;**** (ii) The penalties included the sanction of compensation to “the victim” in an amount not exceeding twenty thousand dollars, as well as a “penalty” of not more than ten thousand dollars.**** Canadian Human Rights Act**** (R.S., 1985 c. H-6) Sections 53(3) and 54(1) (1.1)**** (iii) The amendment also included a broadening of the term telecommunications to include computers, groups of interconnected computers, including the internet or any other similar means of communication.**** ** ** 20. It is submitted that Member Hadjis was correct in finding that the addition of the penalty provisions substantively altered the *Taylor*reasoning and the application of the *Oakes* proportionality test, and while offending section 2(b) of the Charter, could not be saved by s.1 thereof.**** ** ** 21. Member Hadjis’ reasoning was clear and concise:**** (293) As I have found above, this context has changed with the introduction of the penalty in s. 54(1)(c). Section 13 now plays a significant and more than a “minimal” role in the imposition of both financial and moral sanctions.**** Reasons for Decision, September 2, 2009 @ para. 293**** ** ** *ISSUE #2 - Did the Tribunal err in failing to sever Sections 54(1) and 54(1.1) from the effects of Section 13?* * * 22. It is submitted that no error in law was committed by the Tribunal with respect to severance of Sections 54(1) and (1.1).**** ** ** 23. The Tribunal stated:**** *V. Conclusion:* * *“Since a formal declaration of invalidity is not a remedy available to the Tribunal... I will simply refuse to apply these provisions for the purposes of the complaint against Mr. Lemire and I will not issue any remedial order against him.”**** Reasons for Decision, page 73, Conclusion.**** ** ** 24. The amendments to the Act clearly spell out the Orders available to the Tribunal: Section 54(1) provides:**** *54.** (1) If a member or panel finds that a complaint related to a discriminatory practice described in section 13 is substantiated, the member or panel may make only one or more of the following orders:* * (a) an order containing terms referred to in paragraph 53(2)(a);* *(b) an order under subsection 53(3) to compensate a victim specifically identified in the communication that constituted the discriminatory practice; and* * (c) an order to pay a penalty of not more than ten thousand * * 25. Section 53(2)(a) sets out an extensive list of orders and remedies available to the Tribunal, none of which permit or refer to severance by the Tribunal. 26. It is submitted that what parliament has enacted cannot be undone or legislatively altered by the Tribunal. 27. As Justice McLachlin stated in Taylor: “In my view, it is no answer to the absence of rational connection between the broad sweep of legislation and its objectives, to say that in practice, Commissioners and members of tribunals may choose not to enforce the overbroad aspects of a provision. Rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter cannot be left to the administrative discretion of those employed by or retained by the state.” (emphasis added) Taylor, (supra) at. p. 964 28. A quasi-judicial tribunal cannot declare an act of parliament invalid, only a court can entertain constitutional challenges, notwithstanding extensive jurisdiction afforded to the Tribunals. Casimir et al. v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2005, 1 S.C.R. 257, CanLII S.C.C. 16 ISSUE # 3 - Are Sections 13, 54(1) and 54(1.1) constitutionally valid? 29. If the court is satisfied that S. 13(1) intrudes on the fundamental freedom of expression in ways that cannot, even with the greatest deference to Parliament, be justified by the objectives it seeks to promote, the court may and should declare the offending section unconstitutional. Taylor, (supra) Per McLachlin at p. 968 30. It is respectfully submitted that the reviewing court should draw heavily from the reasons for the vigorous dissent put forward by current Chief Justice B. McLachlin. 31. Specifically with respect to the validity of Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, Justice McLachlin referred to some of the factors that should in these proceedings warrant a careful review by the Federal Court: (a) The restrictions of Section 13(1) on free expression are designed and “intended to control attempts to convey a meaning by restricting the context of expression” and therefore violates s. 2(b) of the Charter. Taylor (supra) at p. 954 (b) This Section does not “achieve the objective in manner consistent with the proportionality test in Oakes. The practical effects of the legislation may run counter to the stated objective. Taylor (supra) at p. 161 (i) There is no limitation on the restriction of defensible speech. (p. 959) (ii) There is no effort to accommodate the important right of free expression. (p. 959) (iii) The Section is unlikely to curb discrimination, and in many other respects, may have a “contrary effect”. (p. 961) (iv) Words such as “hatred”, “contempt” and “likely” are vague and meaningless. (p. 961) (v) “dislike” is apt to be considered by some as equivalent to discrimination. (p. 961) (vi) There is no provision in the section for truth of the impugned expression. (p. 961) The breadth of the section is widened by the absence of any requirement of intent or foreseeability of the actual promotion of hatred or contempt. (p. 962) 32. Specifically as to the issue of truth as a necessary factor in restrictive legislation, Justice McLachlin stated: “the value of seeking truth is one of the strongest justifications for freedom of expression. It is essential to the "marketplace of ideas" which is a condition of a free, vibrant society. It is equally central to the rationales of the working of democracy and self-fulfilment that underlie freedom of expression. Individuals in a free society assume that, whatever restriction it may be necessary to place on free speech, they will always have the right to say what is true. That right cannot lightly be restricted. Thus, the exclusion of the defence of truth from s. 13(1) cannot but seriously increase the degree of infringement of freedom of expression which the provision effects”. Taylor (supra) at p. 966 33. And again: Another aspect of the overreaching nature of s. 13(1) is the fact that it allows the Commission to interfere with the strictly private communication of ideas. In this respect s. 13(1) again goes further than s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code. The benefit obtained from prohibiting private conversations between consenting individuals is arguably small, since only those who are already receptive to such messages are likely to be interested in receiving them. On the other hand, the invasion of privacy may be significant. Without suggesting that prohibition of offensive telephone calls could never be justified, the fact that private communications are banned cannot but enhance the significance of the infringement of the rights of the individual effected by s. 13(1) of the Act. Taylor (supra) at p. 967 34. It is significant to note that the evidence before the Tribunal included the report of Dr. Michael Persinger. Member Hadjis acknowledged that Dr. Persinger used the words “vague and meaningless” to characterize the loss of self-esteem if an individual or group is subjected to racial or religious hatred. While the Persinger report was rejected, it is nonetheless significant when coupled with Madam Justice McLachlin’s characterization of the concepts of “hatred” and “contempt” as “vague and subjective”, and “capable of extension should the interpreter be so included”. Persinger Report, Ex. R-5 35. The issue at hand is in part one of tolerance. Tolerance of the rights of “bloggers” to freely express themselves over the internet. Tolerance of the “designated” group in accepting the right of the bloggers to express themselves. It is a two-way street, and one of the singular issues of our time is the patent discrimination and intolerance of certain designated groups against those who wish to vigorously debate issues which may not be favourable to their political, ethnic, religion or cultural positions. Use of the word “likely” in Section 13(1) benefits only the complainant, not the author, regardless of truth. 36. Many of the past complaints have involved serious encroachments upon the ights of the accused, including police intervention and the subsequent disclosure of information to the complainant who has no authority whatever to possess police disclosure. Having regard to the proven abuse by the Canadian Human Rights Commission, it is submitted that the entirety of Section 13(1) must be justifiably struck down. 37. It is the position of the Canadian Association for Free Expression that Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act is an anachronism and has no place in a free and just society. PART IV – ORDER REQUESTED 38. A declaration that sections 13(1) and 54(1) and (1.1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act are a violation of subsections 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, are not saved by Section 1 thereof, and as such, are of no force or effect pursuant to sections 24(1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 39. An Order dismissing this judicial review application. 40. Such further and other order as this Honourable Court may deem just. Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June, 2011. _____________________________ Gerald E. Langlois, Q.C. Counsel for Canadian Association for Free Expression PART V – AUTHORITIES 1. Mohamed Elmasry et al. v. Roger’s Publishing Ltd. and Ken MacQueen 2. Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Taylor 3. Ramsden v. Peterborough (City) 4. Casimir et al. v. Quebec (Attorney General) APPENDIX A – STATUTORY AUTHORITIES The Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms Rights and 1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms freedoms in guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it Canada subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Fundamental Freedoms Fundamental 2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: freedoms (a) freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and (d) freedom of association Canadian Human Rights Act, H-6 Hate messages 13. (1) It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. Interpretation (2) For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies in respect of a matter that is communicated by means of a computer or a group if interconnected or related computers, including the Internet, or any similar means of communication, but does not apply in respect of a matter that is communicated in whole or in part by mans of the facilities of a broadcasting undertaking. Interpretation (3) For the purposes of this section, no owner or operator of a telecommunication undertaking communicates or causes to be communicated any matter described in subsection (1) by reason only that the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking owned or operated by that person are used by other persons for the transmission of that matter. Orders relating to hate messages 54.(1) If a member or panel finds that a complaint related to a discriminatory practice described in section 13 is substantiated, the member or panel may take only one or more of the following orders: (a) an order containing terms referred to in paragraph 53(2)(a); (b) an order under subsection 53(3) to compensate a victim specifically identified in the communication that constituted the discriminatory practice; and (c) an order to pay a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars. Factors (1.1) In deciding whether to order the person to pay the penalty, the member or panel shall take into account the following factors: (a) the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the discriminatory practice; and (b) the wilfulness or intent of the person who engaged the discriminatory practice, any prior discriminatory practices that the person has engaged in and the person’s ability to pay the penalty. Idem (2) No order under subsection 53(2) may contain a term (a) requiring the removal of an individual from a position if that individual accepted employment in that position in good faith; or (b) requiring the expulsion of an occupant from any premises or accommodation, if that occupant obtained such premises or accommodation in good faith. *